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PARTICULAR AMENABILITY TO PROBATION AND 
THE TROG FACTORS: REWARDING WEALTH AND 






“Particular amenability to probation” and the use of the Trog factors 
should be significantly reformed and restricted as grounds for allowing a 
defendant to avoid prison in criminal sentencing.1 In practice, “particular 
amenability to probation” is a backdoor for courts and prosecutors to consider 
otherwise impermissible factors, such as: socio-economic status, privilege, 
wealth, education, cultural beliefs, and political beliefs. As a result, 
defendants who have access to wealth, privilege, and prior social success are 
more likely to avoid prison under the law as it stands. 
To be clear, this is not an exploration of implicit bias at work in the 
field of criminal sentencing. To the contrary, this article explores problematic 
fragments of the law itself that explicitly allows judges and prosecutors to 
make sentencing decisions favoring wealth, privilege, and social status.2 
Worse yet, the law under consideration grants practitioners the inverse power 
to more severely punish defendants based on cultural, philosophical, and 
socio-economic factors under the aegis of the law. A judge or lawyer 
exercising their discretion based on these factors can arguably do so in “good 
faith.” The license granted by the law to use these factors is inherently 
problematic and merits reconsideration.  
 
* Sean Cahill is a Senior Assistant County Attorney in Hennepin County, 
Minnesota and teaches at Mitchell Hamline School of Law and the University of 
St. Thomas School of Law.  
1 Trog factors are named for the leading case in Minnesota, State v. Trog, 323 
N.W. 2d 28 (Minn. 1982), which recognized a common law right for a court to 
depart from the Sentencing Guidelines and listed several factors to inform such a 
departure.   
2 The exclusion of defense attorneys is purposeful because of their duty to 
pursue their client’s best interest. Where judges and prosecutors should be wary in 
the application of the law presented, defense attorneys face different obligations.  
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This article focuses on Minnesota law as means of illustration. 
Particularly, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Trog 
established a common law authority that—particularly in light of recent 
events—should be set aside. Particular amenability to probation and the Trog 
factors permit courts to make sentencing determinations on otherwise 
impermissible factors, such as socio-economic status. The courts should 
abandon use of these factors in the interest of fairness and consistency.  
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF “PARTICULAR AMENABILITY TO 
PROBATION” 
Minnesota criminal sentencing is governed by the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines.3 Through the Guidelines are advisory, if a sentencing 
court fails to identify and articulate “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” supporting a departure from the guidelines, the sentence is 
illegal and subject to reversal.4 The Guidelines recognize two types of 
departure: durational and dispositional. A durational departure is a sentence 
that carries either a lengthier sentence (upward or aggravated departure) or 
shorter sentence (downward or mitigated departure).5 “A dispositional 
departure places the offender in a different setting than that called for by the 
presumptive guidelines sentence."6 Most often, the court either sends a 
defendant to prison despite a presumptive stayed sentence (aggravated) or 
pronounces a stayed sentence despite a presumptive prison term (mitigated).7 
These types of departures are separate and distinct decisions by a court, 
requiring separate and individual bases for each departure. “Offense-related” 
factors may support either a durational or dispositional departure, but 
“offender-related” factors relate only to dispositional departures.8  
Since their inception, the Guidelines explicitly barred certain facts 
from being considered in any departure. In the first set of guidelines, the 
Commission barred race, sex, employment factors, social factors (like 
education, marital status, length and circumstances of residence), and the 
 
3 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. (MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
COMM’N 2019).  
4 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03, subd. 4(C); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND 
COMMENT. § 2.D.1.c (2019); MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subd. 2.; Williams v. State, 
361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985).  
5 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 1.B.5.b.(2019). 
6 State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).  
7 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 1.B.5.a. (2019). 
8 State v. Behl, 573 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Walker, 
913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
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exercise of constitutional rights from being used as factors to support a 
departure.9 Those factors remain unchanged in 2019.10 
However, for any factors that may be present, those circumstances 
must be “substantial and compelling.”11 Substantial and compelling 
circumstances are “those circumstances that make the facts of a particular 
case different from a typical case,” or “atypical.”12 Their existence is a 
threshold issue for departure.13 The Guidelines provide a non-exclusive list 
of aggravating and mitigating factors that can constitute substantial and 
compelling circumstances that may justify a departure.14 In terms of a 
downward departure, the Guidelines recognize factors like: victim was an 
aggressor; passive role, coercion, or duress; lacking substantial capacity for 
judgment due to physical or mental impairment other than intoxication; 
alternative placement for a defendant with serious and persistent mental 
illness; and reasonable evidence a chemically dependent offender can and 
will respond to a treatment program.15 However, second to last on the list is 
the subject of inquiry. Under Section 2.D.3.a(7), the Guidelines state that 
downward departure may be merited if: 
 
The offender is particularly amenable to probation. This factor may, 
but need not, be supported by the fact that the offender is particularly 
amenable to a relevant program of individualized treatment in a 
probationary setting.16 
 
Arguably, the language “particularly amenable to probation” is the 
broadest—and arguably ambiguous—factor on the list. It also happens to be 
a fairly recent addition.  
 
9 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.1 (MINN. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES COMM’N 1980). 
10 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.2 (2019).  
11 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D. (1980); MINN. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES § 2.D.1 (2019).  
12 State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985); Walker, 913 N.W.2d at 
468. 
13 State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).  
14 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.3.a (2019).  
15 Id. 
16 Id. at § 2.D.3.a(7) (2019). 
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The “particularly amenable” factor was added in August 2015.17 The 
original 1980 list contained four mitigation factors, which included: victim 
was an aggressor; minor or passive role or committed under coercion or 
duress; lack of substantial capacity due to mental or physical impairment; 
and any other substantial grounds not amounting to a defense.18 Two other 
factors were added prior to 2015. In August 1989, the Commission added a 
technical factor noting a departure is merited if prior convictions were 
sentenced in either less than three or in one hearings, depending on their 
severity.19 In August 2003, the Commission added a sixth factor regarding 
alternative placements for serious and persistent mental illness20 Being only 
the third addition in 35 years to the mitigating factors list, the August 2015 
amendment suggests the Commission was responding to some new 
impetus.21 
More accurately, the impetus was the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
application of Trog and its progeny in a remarkable split decision, State v. 
Soto.22 Where Trog broadened a court’s basis for dispositional departure by 
recognizing several factors which a court may consider, Soto set a boundary 
on the application of those factors. However, in doing so, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court— almost unnoticeably— revived a more difficult and 
troubling truth about Minnesota sentencing under the Trog factors. 
A. State v. Trog 
 State v. Trog is a remarkably concise opinion.23 The issue was 
straightforward: did the district court err by staying a defendant’s presumed 
prison sentence?24 Handed down on August 17, 1982, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, not only found the district court did not err, 
but it endorsed the factors used by the district court to arrive at its sentence.25  
 
17 ADOPTED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D 
(MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N 2015).  
18 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.2 (1980).  
19 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.2 (1989). 
20 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.2 (2003). 
21 That impetus was State v. Trog and its progeny. 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 
1982) (en banc). 
22 855 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2014). 
23 Trog, 323 N.W.2d (Covering just over three pages, including headnotes).  
24 Id. at 29.  
25 Id. at 29. The en banc notation merits notice. The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals would be founded over a year later in November 1983. As both the court 
of highest authority and an error-correcting court at the time, the Minnesota 
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  The defendant Rick Trog was a “young man,” though the Court 
never notes his actual age.26 The State of Minnesota charged Mr. Trog with 
several offenses that occurred during a single behavioral incident.27 Mr. Trog 
pleaded guilty to one count of “burglary with assault” in exchange for all 
other charges being dropped. 28  
At sentencing, Mr. Trog presented a compelling case. The Court 
summarized the presentence report as stating: 
 
[D]efendant apparently has been an “outstanding citizen.” 
He had no prior involvement with the police, even as a 
juvenile, had done well in school and had an excellent work 
record. The report also showed that defendant, who had been 
intoxicated at the time of the incident, had cooperated with 
police and had been shaken by the incident and was 
extremely contrite.29  
 
The Court further noted several witnesses gave statements on defendant’s 
behalf and quoted supportive testimony by the defendant’s father and a St. 
Paul police officer, who had known the defendant since Mr. Trog’s 
childhood.30 The Court highlighted:  
 
. . .[D]efendant's attorney, pointing to defendant's prior 
record of law-abiding behavior, his remorse, his cooperation 
and his respectful attitude, the strong support shown him by 
family and friends and the fact that a stayed sentence would 
keep defendant under continuing supervision over a longer 
period, made a strong plea for probation.31 
 
Obviously, this is one of those opinions the reader can see the outcome 
coming before making it to the end of the fact section. But the surprise does 
not come with the Court’s outcome, but in what it endorses in getting there.  
 
Supreme Court’s decision to decide the matter en banc demonstrates the Court 
purposefully made a new statement of substantive law here.  
26 Id. at 30. 
27 Id. at 29. 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 30.  
31 Id.  
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 The Trog court began its legal analysis by recognizing its own recent 
precedent, State v. Wright, regarding downward dispositional departures. “. . 
. [J]ust as a defendant's particular unamenability to probation will justify 
departure in the form of an execution of a presumptively stayed sentence, a 
defendant's particular amenability to individualized treatment in a 
probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a stay of execution 
of a presumptively executed sentence.”32 In Wright, unlike Trog, the Court 
affirmed a trial court departure from a prison sentence based almost 
exclusively on the question of the appropriate treatment setting. In Wright, 
the trial court’s basis for a dispositional departure was: 
 
. . .the opinion of the psychiatrist and the [probation] agent 
who prepared the presentence investigation report, [who] 
concluded that there was a strong reason for believing that 
defendant would be victimized in prison and that both 
defendant and society would be better off if defendant were 
sent to the workhouse for a short time, then given treatment, 
and then supervised on probation for the remainder of the 20 
years.33 
 
The Court affirmed the sentence and downward dispositional departure. 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court acknowledged that none of the Sentencing 
Guidelines’ listed mitigating factors (then-year-old) were present.34 The 
Court justified its decision because the Guidelines factors were non-
exclusive.35 In short, State v. Wright established a common-law mitigating 
sentencing factor: particular amenability to probation by showing 
amenability to individualized treatment.  
The Trog court dramatically expanded Wright’s narrow 
common-law mitigation factor and did so in a jarringly perfunctory 
manner. Trog held: 
 
Numerous factors, including the defendant's age, his prior 
record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in 
court, and the support of friends and/or family, are relevant 
 
32 Id. at 31 (citing State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1981)). 
33 Wright, 310 N.W.2d at 462–63. 
34 Id. at 462.  
35 Id.  
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to a determination whether a defendant is particularly 
suitable to individualized treatment in a probationary setting. 
All these factors were present in this case and justify the 
dispositional departure. 
The only issue in this case is whether the dispositional 
departure was justified. Believing that it was justified, we 
affirm.36 
 
In two sentences, the Minnesota Supreme Court endorsed an entire new list 
of facts that could be used to support the common-law mitigating factor of 
amenability to probation. A list of facts and a mitigating factor that would 
not be recognized by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission for 
another twenty-three years. In practice, these facts have been collectively 
referred to as the “Trog factors.” Trog also severed the common-law 
mitigation factors that a district court can consider from the concept of 
amenability to individualized treatment; that is the Court saw the Trog 
factors as an additional basis for finding particular amenability to probation.37 
As will be explored later but worth mentioning here, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of the Trog factors injected socio-economic factors 
(explicitly rejected by the Guidelines Commission) into the court’s 
sentencing analysis. While the Trog factors may appear to be a reasonable 
expansion allowing consideration of the “whole person,”38 this more 
expansive approach also served as a wolf in sheep’s clothing.  
B. State v. King 
The following year, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a 
practical tension between the Trog factors and the impermissible use of social 
or financial factors to support a dispositional departure in State v. King.39 
Like Trog, King is a terse opinion. The Court addressed a challenge to a 
district court’s downward dispositional departure for a defendant who had 
 
36 State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31.  
37 See State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006); State v. King, 337 
N.W.2d 674, 675-76 (Minn. 1983). 
38 See State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983) (“However, 
when justifying only a dispositional departure, the trial court can focus more on the 
defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best 
for him and for society.”).  
39 337 N.W.2d 674 (Minn. 1983). 
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been convicted of aggravated robbery but had no other criminal history.40 
The presumed sentence was a year and a day in prison.41 
Instead, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a stay of execution 
for a period of ten years, spend ten months in jail, pay restitution, and 
participate in a treatment program.42 The motivation of the defendant to take 
an arguably harsher sentence over an execution of sentence was his desire to 
maintain his employment on release, help pay bills, and keep his family 
together.43 On review, the Supreme Court held: 
 
While it is true that social and financial factors may not be 
directly considered as reasons for departure, occasionally 
they bear indirectly on a determination such as whether a 
defendant is particularly suitable to treatment in a 
probationary setting. That is the case here.44  
 
The Court affirmed the departure.45  
An apologist could claim the King rule is just grounded in reality. A 
person’s access to treatment or programming is impacted by social and 
economic status. Wealth means you have your pick of treatment facilities; 
poverty means you’re stuck with whatever the government approves for 
funding through your chemical health assessment. Or, in the case of King, 
working and keeping your family together is a motivation to be successful in 
treatment. A cynic could claim the King rule is simply a backdoor for the 
court to make judgments based on factors that society has recognized have a 
potentially discriminatory effect. For example, why should socio-economic 
factors matter? Place of birth, family, and familial wealth are all factors a 
defendant cannot choose. Admittedly, the concern of this article is, “What if 
the cynic is right—even if only in one case?” 
C. State v. Soto 
 On October 22, 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court brought the 
Trog factors to the forefront in a split decision, State v. Soto.46 Writing for 
 
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 675.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 675-6.  
45 State v. King, 337 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Minn. 1983). 
46 855 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2014). 
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the majority, Justice Lillehaug noted the case was one of those “rare cases” 
where the district court is found to have abused its discretion at sentencing.47 
Specifically, the majority found that the district court had correctly identified 
facts meeting the Trog factors, but held: “a few of the factors that we have 
recognized as potentially relevant might suggest that Soto could be amenable 
to probation. But those factors, individually and collectively, provide very 
little support for the further conclusion that Soto had any particular 
amenability to probation relative to other defendants” (emphasis in the 
original).48 Combined with a finding that the district court had not 
demonstrated that amenability to outpatient treatment rose to the level of 
particular amenability, the Soto court’s focus on the term “particular” 
emphasizes the boundary it was now articulating. In its review of the Trog 
factors in the case, the Minnesota Supreme Court made a new boundary in 
applying those factors. The mere possibility of success in treatment is not 
sufficient to depart, but more a showing of certainty or likelihood.  
 The facts of Soto were particularly chilling. Jose Soto had been 
convicted of first degree criminal sexual assault.49 Mr. Soto and another had 
been charged with holding down a victim and taking turns to penetrate her 
anally.50 Mr. Soto then told the other man to leave and proceeded to orally 
and vaginally rape his victim for two hours, while choking, slapping, and 
physically injuring her.51 Mr. Soto chose to plead guilty rather than face trial.  
 In exchange for the State dropping its pursuit of an aggravated 
sentence, Mr. Soto offered a plea of guilt falling somewhere between an 
Alford plea and a Norgaard plea, claiming insufficient memory due to his 
intoxication during the incident.52 There was no agreement as to the sentence. 
At the sentencing, the court received a presentence investigation report 
recommending prison, but it also noted that Mr. Soto “appears to be an 
appropriate candidate for participation in the outpatient Sexual Abuse 
Treatment program.”53 The report also provided an excerpt of the defendant’s 
version of the incident, stating:  
 
 
47 Id. at 305.  
48 Id. at 310-12.  
49 Id. at 306.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 307.  
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I had consensual sex with a female who was cheating on her 
boyfriend and to get out of it she said I raped her! I am not a 
violent person and do feel as [if] the woman I had sex with 
is a liar and a coward and I do not deserve to be in jail for 
something I didn't do!54 
 
However, at the hearing, Mr. Soto apologized to his victim.55 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court summarized the district court’s findings as follows: 
 
According to the district court, the “sole reason” for 
departing from the presumptive disposition was Soto's 
“amenability to probation.” A significant factor in the 
district court's conclusion that Soto was amenable to 
probation was the statement in the Upper Mississippi Mental 
Health Center's diagnostic assessment that Soto was an 
“appropriate candidate” for its outpatient treatment program. 
Telling Soto that he would have an opportunity to correct his 
behavior, the district court emphasized that Soto was “only 
37 years of age,” that he did not have many serious crimes 
in his record, and that it was “primarily alcohol that night 
[that] was the problem.” The district court also remarked that 
Soto's attitude in court was “largely . . . respectful” and that 
“this particular type of event seems largely out of character.” 
Finally, the district court noted that Soto “seem[ed] to have 
some family support” and that focusing on his 10-year-old 
son might motivate him to correct his behavior. The district 
court did not say anything about Soto's culpability in 
sexually assaulting M.F. or whether putting Soto on 
supervised probation would protect public safety.56 
 
The Court then considered each of the factors in its legal analysis to 
determine whether a dispositional departure was merited under the facts 
presented. Importantly, most of the factors cited by the district court were 
Trog factors.  
 
54 Id. at 306.  
55 Id. at 307.  
56 Id.  
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 The Court began by emphasizing that the basis for the district court’s 
departure—amenability to probation—was not listed as a mitigating factor 
under the Sentencing Guidelines, but again noted that the Guidelines’ factors 
were “non-exclusive.”57 As a result, the Court turned to the language of its 
common-law precedent in Trog and Wright.58 The majority opinion 
emphasized that the standard for review is particular amenability to 
probation, not merely amenability.59 It then turned to consider the mitigating 
factors under two implicit prongs: (1) particular amenability to an 
individualized treatment program60 and (2) particular amenability under the 
Trog factors.61 Ultimately, the Court did not fault the district court for 
recognizing and applying the mitigating factors in sentencing. Instead, the 
Court found that the district abused its discretion because the factors only 
established, at best, amenability to probation and not particular amenability. 
The Court vacated the sentence and remanded for further proceedings.  
 In its consideration of the Trog factors, the Soto court specifically 
dealt with Mr. Soto’s status as a father.62 The lower appellate court rejected 
this fact as inappropriate for consideration because it was a prohibited “social 
or economic factor” under the Guidelines.63 The Supreme Court rejected this 
analysis, favoring its qualification under State v. King. “The courts of 
appeals' holding, again, is inconsistent with our recognition that facts that 
cannot themselves justify a departure can be relevant to determining whether 
a defendant is particularly amenable to probation” (emphasis added).64 So 
the Soto court not only revisited the use of Trog factors in sentencing, but it 
also reinforced their common-law precedent that the Guidelines’ otherwise 
prohibited social and economic factors could be used to support the 
mitigating factor of particular amenability to probation—even though such 
mitigating factor was not recognized by the Guidelines. In short, the Court 
reinvigorated the apparent conflict between the Trog factors and the 
explicitly prohibited factors under the Guidelines.  
 The Soto dissent registers a meaningful criticism regarding the 
majority’s reasoning about a new threshold question. Justice Page wrote the 
 
57 Id. at 308.  
58 State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014).  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 309-10.  
61 Id. at 310-12. 
62 Id. at 312. 
63 Id. 
64 Id.   
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dissent, joined by Chief Justice Gildea and Justice Anderson, and highlighted 
that the trial court made no error in applying the Trog factors and considering 
amenability to treatment.65 The dissent accuses the majority of simply 
disagreeing over the outcome and wishing to substitute its own judgment.66 
Given that the majority hinged its legal analysis on the term “particularly” 
and framed the issue as a threshold question—the dissent’s criticism is 
poignant. The trial court found the Trog factor evidence was good enough to 
merit a departure; the Supreme Court majority simply disagreed. More 
importantly, the dissent shows the entire court had no issue with the Trog 
factors or how they were individually applied.  
Overall, the Soto decision combined the holdings of Wright, Trog, 
King, and its progeny into a single framework of analysis. A district court 
can dispositionally depart from a presumed prison sentence if there are 
factors showing a defendant’s particular amenability to probation. Particular 
amenability could be established if a court found one of two complementary 
bases: either a defendant was particularly amenable to individualized 
treatment in the community or the Trog factors demonstrated substantial and 
compelling reasons to depart.  
In turn, the Soto decision posed four issues to the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission. One, the common-law mitigating 
factor of “particular amenability to probation” remained unrecognized by 
the Sentencing Guidelines, despite its obvious use at the district court level. 
Two, the Court endorsed its own use of the Trog factors—also 
unrecognized by the Guidelines—to support a mitigating dispositional 
departure. Three, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of otherwise 
impermissible factors under the Guidelines (social and economic 
circumstances) to justify application of this common-law mitigation factor. 
And four, the Court had now reversed a district court’s decision for 
misapplying these factors. More succinctly, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had developed an entirely independent jurisprudence around its own 
mitigating factor for dispositional departures—and now, a district court had 
been found to abuse its discretion based on that jurisprudence. While only 
advisory, the Guidelines serve a practical purpose in telling judges where 
they can tread confidently in sentencing; where caution and careful 
explanation is necessary; and where they should absolutely not venture. As 
 
65 Id. at 315-16. 
66 Id.  
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Soto demonstrated, there was an area of sentencing where the Guidelines 
simply failed to offer guidance.  
II. 2015 SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENTS 
 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission diligently 
responded to the Soto case at the first opportunity it had: the 2015 
Amendments to the Guidelines. In light of Soto, the Commission added both 
a new mitigating factor and a corresponding comment. It formally adopted 
the “particularly amenable to probation” factor, noting that it may, but not 
necessarily, include particularly amenable to “individualized treatment in a 
probationary setting.”67 The corresponding comment, Section 2.D.303, 
embodies three rules of law from Minnesota Supreme Court precedent.68 
First, it reiterates that any reasons for departure must be substantial and 
compelling. Second, it embraces the King holding, as expressed through 
Soto, stating: “while social or economic factors cannot justify a departure, 
such facts may be relevant to determining whether a defendant is particularly 
amenable to probation.” 69 Third, the comment endorses the Trog factors as 
grounds to support a departure. Neither the factor nor the comment have been 
changed in subsequent amendments.  
The Guidelines now match Minnesota Supreme Court precedent. By 
doing so, the Guidelines Commission adopted an inherent tension posed by 
the Trog factors, the King rule, and the Guidelines’ express prohibition from 
considering social or economic factors. It also adopted the broad, ambiguous 
nature of the Trog factors. The combination of these two issues may not be 
concerning on its face. But when we see how widely “particular amenability” 
is used by the courts as a basis for departure, one wonders if this basis for 
departure is not so restrictive as held in Soto.  
III. PARTICULAR AMENABILITY TO PROBATION: 2016 TO 2018 
 From 2016 to 2018, Minnesota courts used “particularly amenable 
to probation” with considerable regularity in justifying dispositional 
departures. In those three years, Minnesota courts granted 6,316 dispositional 
departures. Of those departures, 4,150 (just under 66%) listed “particular 
amenability to probation” as a factor supporting the departure. This rate 
implies two things: one, the district courts were perfectly comfortable using 
 
67 ADOPTED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 
2.D (MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N 2015). 
68 MINNESOTA SENT’G GUIDELINES AND COMMENT. § 2.D.303 cmt. (2019).  
69 See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 312.  
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particular amenability as a basis for departure and had been using it well 
before the Guidelines’ adoption, and two, particular amenability is a broad 
and flexible concept on the ground. These implications are also supported by 
the rate of downward dispositional departures in total. From 2016 to 2018, 
Minnesota courts displayed a stable and consistent departure rate. In 2016, 
Minnesota courts departed dispositionally in 35.9% from all presumptive 
prison commit sentences.70 In 2017, 34.0%71; and in 2018, 35.8%.72 In 
combination, this means over these three years approximately 22 or 23 out 
of every 100 felons facing a presumptive prison commitment received a 
downward dispositional departure based on “particular amenability to 
probation.” A missing piece of data is how often the Trog factors are used by 
the courts, leaving it unknown which Soto prong (individualized treatment or 
Trog factors) a sentencing court is relying upon for its decision. Regardless, 
the particular amenability to probation factor supporting downward 
dispositional departures is a widely used tool by Minnesota courts.  
IV. PRACTICAL IMPACTS OF PARTICULAR AMENABILITY AND TROG 
FACTORS 
A. Wealth and Privilege 
 The problem with “particular amenability” and the Trog factors is 
the myriad of ways these factors reward wealth, privilege, and 
moral/philosophical “buy-in.” Though no Minnesota court would explicitly 
cite to such in good conscience while sentencing, wealth and privilege 
touches most of the Trog factors and amenability to probation generally. 
Please pardon the anecdotal nature of the argument, but the use of broad 
caricatures here will hopefully conjure up plausible archetypes that resonate 
with most criminal law practitioner’s experience. Rather than individually 
exploring how each amenability or Trog factor can be impacted, it is 
somewhat easier to consider how aspects of wealth and privilege impact 
multiple factors at the same time. It is also worthwhile to define the terms 
“wealth” and “privilege” as they are used here.  
 
70 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENT’G PRACTICES: ANNUAL 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS 60 (2017). 
71 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENT’G PRACTICES: ANNUAL 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS 63 (2018). 
72 MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENT’G PRACTICES: ANNUAL 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS 68 (2019). 
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In both cases, “wealth” and “privilege” are used broadly. “Wealth” 
refers to the relative abundance of a person’s financial resources that can be 
tapped in times of crisis. This can mean any number of possible resources 
that could be converted to cash or payment for services, high incomes, or 
access to generational wealth. For example, a defendant may not have a large 
amount of cash reserves to spend, but she may own property, large luxury 
goods (such as a high-end car or boat), trust funds, or even a strong credit 
rating. Property or goods may serve as collateral to access loans or may be 
quickly liquidated for significant cash payouts. A strong credit rating will 
increase the likelihood of obtaining loans, payment plans, and more favorable 
borrowing terms. In turn, “privilege” refers to general socio-economic 
benefits tied to greater wealth, but also to stable social and family 
environments. Access to good schools, a diversity of employment options, 
safe and healthy communities. . .all increase the likelihood that a person will 
have greater social mobility and tools to weather a life crisis. “Privilege” may 
also refer to the underlying social skills and cultural literacy. The economic 
term “class” is helpful because it recognizes the social connections and 
identities often associated with various strata of wealth. The compounding 
effect of generational wealth cannot be understated either. For younger 
offenders, the power of the Trog factors is most often unlocked not through 
their own wealth, but through the wealth and privilege provided by their 
family. Whether personal or familial, access to resources and the ability to 
obtain significant cash funds within days, if not weeks, has practical 
ramifications that increase the likelihood of demonstrating a “particular 
amenability to probation.”  
 As a caveat, I do not suggest persons of a particular class will act or 
behave in a particular manner based on their social-economic status. 
However, wealth and privilege tend to correlate with other social goods: 
better schools, safer neighborhoods, better healthcare, access to higher 
quality foods, etc. These social goods in turn have collateral effects that 
impact behavior, social customs, interpersonal communication, and social 
mobility. The combination of access to resources and certain social 
competencies will impact how a defendant may be able to use the Trog 
factors to his or her benefit. Conversely, defendants who do not have the 
same resources, social skills, or cultural competencies may find the Trog 
factors of limited value.  
To start, wealth has the simple benefit of increasing a defendant’s 
access to treatment. Impoverished defendants seeking treatment are bound 
by the limits and rules of government funding, minimal health insurance, and 
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availability. In contrast, wealthy defendants are more likely to have their pick 
of treatments – so long as they are willing to pay out of pocket. Greater wealth 
means greater choice which means greater likelihood of accessing treatment 
services. It also increases the speed with which treatment can begin. If you 
can pay out of pocket, you are not stuck waiting for funding approval.  
Wealth also improves the likelihood of demonstrating “amenability 
to probation” by enabling defendants to avoid pretrial detention. Obviously, 
greater wealth means a greater likelihood of paying any monetary pretrial 
bail. So, rather than being held in a county jail pending trial, a defendant can 
use that limited period of time to: establish a foothold in a treatment program, 
secure employment that will not be impacted should he be convicted, 
preemptively engage in therapy or anger management, demonstrate a 
sustained period of sobriety, etc. A defendant in the community can establish 
months of independent engagement in prosocial activities, court compliance, 
treatment, and reform in the community – precisely what the judge wants to 
see in a defendant on probation in the community. In contrast, a detained 
defendant cannot build a record of pretrial reform in the community. Whereas 
detained defendant must overcome the doubt that any progress or services 
completed while incarcerated will “hold up” when the defendant returns to 
the community with all its freedoms and temptations.  
Not to mention, wealth can impact quality of services. An alcoholic 
treatment center with perks like outdoor yoga, guided meditation, talk 
therapy, and designer-coffee fueled support groups is probably a much more 
enjoyable experience than a revolving-door treatment center housed in an old 
urban school with off-white concrete block walls that focuses on triage and 
worksheets. Wealth not only increases the choice a defendant has in 
treatment but increases access to higher quality treatment programs. In turn, 
a defendant’s access to premiere treatment programs turns into a selling point 
to a judge under the Wright rule. Amenability to probation does not mean 
you can buy your way out of prison with a ticket to a premiere treatment 
center; but, those who have access to wealth are far more likely to obtain 
resources necessary to pitch a successful downward departure argument 
based on treatment. Again, the issue is not so much that approximately six of 
every hundred defendants presumed to go to prison upon conviction receive 
a departure; the issue is whether those six are consistently wealthier. Or more 
bluntly, should even one out of 100 be granted a departure because private 
wealth gave them access to resources to receive one?  
Generational wealth and privilege also have the benefit of 
inoculating a defendant or their families from complete disruption in 
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moments of crisis. A defendant who has access to wealth through family has 
greater ease in the day-to-day challenges of meeting treatment expectations, 
and if necessary, meeting other demands like a job or family. Take 
transportation for example. Say a defendant has parents who have a modest 
savings and are committed to helping their child. The defendant owns a 
vehicle which breaks down four weeks into treatment. Parents step in, 
purchase defendant a cheap, but working vehicle to replace it. Defendant 
retains all the benefits of private transportation: flexibility in schedule, faster 
travel from point A to point B, and the ability to store items (like a work 
uniform or food) in the car, increasing accessibility and reducing the 
possibility of theft. This, in turn, makes it more likely the defendant can 
maintain a job in addition to treatment, travel to necessary medical or 
probation appointments at will, and run errands as needed (like picking up 
medication). In contrast, consider a defendant in the same position with no 
access to family wealth. Her car breaks down and she does not have the 
money to replace it. Hiring Uber, Lyft, or taxis is similarly cost-prohibitive. 
So, she turns to public bus transportation. Suddenly, her twenty-minute drive 
to work now takes an hour bus ride (assuming the job site is accessible by 
bus at all). Assuming that does not result in loss of employment due to time 
constraints, that transportation time now eliminates possibility for other 
tasks. This increases the risk of more issues, such as less time for grocery 
shopping, less time for cooking and exercise, exposure to more diseases in 
public, and exposure to the elements while waiting for transport. In turn, 
these pressures may make the cost of attending treatment untenable in the 
financial crisis. The crisis caused by the loss of a vehicle is only one example. 
More disruptive crises, such as loss of a job, a medical crisis, loss of housing, 
or subsequent arrest, could also derail success in a treatment program. 
However, access to family resources help to mitigate the impact of these 
crises and allow the defendant to continue focusing on pursuing treatment. 
This is also why “family support” is included in the Trog factors. A 
defendant’s access to family resources helps defendants manage small crises 
that, managed alone, might derail a defendant’s pro-social activities. In this 
way, generational wealth actually supports a defendant on multiple 
“amenability to probation” factors.  
The other problem is that poverty correlates with a host of social 
problems that would impact multiple factors in gauging amenability to 
probation. Ongoing work in sociology continues to explore how poverty is a 
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multidimensional challenge that exposes people to correlated adversities.73 
As one author reports: “The research indicates the ubiquity of violence, 
health problems, and chaos in the childhoods, homes, schools, and 
neighborhoods of the poor.”74 In one Minnesota study, University of 
Minnesota legal scholar Richard Frase observed that social disadvantage, 
crime, and law enforcement reinforced one another, causing a cyclical pattern 
of incarceration and disadvantage that disproportionately impacted black 
Minnesotans.75 Whatever might cause this correlation, an impoverished 
defendant will likely face challenges on other supportive factors for 
“particular amenability to probation” for treatment or under the Trog factors. 
In the opposite, wealth, privilege, or intergenerational access to either 
provides integral resources necessary to support amenability to probation in 
the community. Sadly, this may indicate that “amenability to probation” 
protects the status quo; wealth helps keep one out of prison and avoids the 
economic harm of incarceration while poverty deprives one of social 
advantages to establish “amenability” but deepens one’s poverty by the 
economic harm caused by a prison sentence. Sufficed to say, a defendant’s 
“particular amenability to probation” under the law may be more a virtue of 
their wealth and privilege rather than a personal commitment to self-reform 
or rehabilitation.  
Correction of this problem can go in two directions. One, particular 
“amenability to probation” is severely restricted to those cases that were so 
directly tied to chemical use or mental health issues that a defendant’s 
culpability for his conduct is significantly reduced. Or two, Minnesota courts 
should drop the “particular” requirement from Soto and more expansively 
permit treatment in lieu of prison. Either direction reduces the impact of 
wealth in accessing and succeeding in treatment.  
B. Attitude in Court and Cooperation 
 Another problematic Trog factor is attitude in court. Remorse has 
been explicitly endorsed by the Minnesota Supreme Court under the 
 
73 Matthew Desmond & Bruce Western, Poverty in America: New Directions 
and Debates, 44.1 ANN. REV. OF SOCIO. 305–18 (2018).  
74 Id. at 308. 
75 Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in 
Minnesota’s Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME AND JUST.: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 201-80, 263 (2009) (arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines’ focus on 
prior criminal history had a major effect in creating racially disparate rates of 
incarceration). 
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amended Guidelines. “A primary justification for considering remorse in 
sentencing is that a defendant's remorse bears on his or her ability to be 
rehabilitated.”76 Generally, the courts have endorsed not only remorse- but 
cooperation.77 The court has also found a level of defensiveness that may 
interfere with treatment does not support a departure.78 Again, this seems like 
a common sense rule on its face, but recent events merit reconsideration.  
 Endorsement of remorse and cooperation with the court (and 
possibly law enforcement) arguably rewards defendants for demonstrating a 
moral disposition that acknowledges wrongdoing and possible willingness to 
change. Remorse, by its nature, reflects a recognition of harm caused and 
acknowledgement of suffering in others. There is a sense of guilt for one’s 
actions.79 This disposition lends itself to a willingness for reform. Therefore, 
remorse is one of the ways a defendant can express a desire to make use of 
treatment rather than prison.  
 Underlying remorse and cooperation, however, is an acceptance of 
the court’s authority. A defendant implicitly says: “I have done wrong and 
you have a right to act upon me.” Quite plainly, the courts have the power 
under Trog to reward those who are going along quietly. This should give 
any student of criminal law pause. It’s no secret that the American criminal 
justice system has come under significant scrutiny in the last decade. 
Watershed moments like Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow, Ferguson 
and Black Lives Matter, the deaths of numerous Black men at the hands of 
police (most recently, the death of George Floyd) have taken hold in the 
public’s consciousness.80 The growth of “system-critical” think tanks, 
advocacy groups, and non-profits (i.e., the Innocence Project, the Bail Project 
or “Freedom Fund”) have raised serious and sustained criticisms to the 
United States’ criminal justice system. Not surprisingly, these criticisms have 
 
76 State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Minn. 2016); State v. Hickman, 666 
N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“An offender's remorse is a relevant 
factor in assessing his amenability to a probation that does not include treatment.”).  
77 State v. Donnay, 600 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
78 State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. 2006).  
79 In contrast, regret is more self-centered. It is a desire to have not committed 
an act for its consequences upon yourself, rather than on how it impacted others. A 
regretful defendant agonizes over her choices due to the pain of consequences; a 
remorseful defendant agonizes over her choices for the pain she has caused others 
through her actions.  
80 In my personal experience, the voir dire process has changed noticeably in 
the last five years. Potential jurors are more consistently expressing doubt, distrust, 
and reluctance to set aside cynicism for police, prosecutors, or the greater justice 
system. 
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reached the ears of defendants who see a system at work upon them for 
nefarious purposes (if they did not already).  
This worldview inherently undercuts a person’s willingness to 
express remorse to or cooperate with the courts. If you see your arrest and 
charging as the symptom of systemic racism, disparate police practices, and 
imbalanced power dynamics, you are unlikely to accept, much more submit 
yourself, to the authority of the courts. Without commenting on the substance 
of these criticisms, it is reasonable to expect that some defendants will 
genuinely question the actions and procedures of the criminal justice system 
in the process. While a court would presumably not punish a defendant for 
such, the withholding of a benefit under the law still causes a detrimental 
impact. To cut to the quick, if a defendant openly questions the actions of 
law enforcement, state prosecution, or the court at all stages based on these 
larger criticisms, would the court extend the benefit of these cooperation and 
attitude Trog factors? The nature of attitude and cooperation factors are a 
carrot to promote calm proceedings, nondisruptive conduct, and defendant 
acquiescence. Granted, there is a range of conduct that a defendant could use 
to voice their challenges, but there are bound to be more excited presentations 
than others. Similar to the arguments below, this issue bears similarities to 
issues around cultural competency. Should courts discourage such protests 
by withholding favorable consideration under the Trog factors of cooperation 
and attitude? I suggest not. Courts have considerable discretion to control a 
courtroom and address problematic behaviors.81 But trying to quell protests 
in the courtroom by withholding favorable consideration in sentencing is an 
exercise in cultural dominance. In engaging in such behavior, a judge is now 
using sentencing as means of control rather than a reflection of criminal 
conduct.  
I posit that the Trog factors of cooperation and attitude are overly 
broad and misguided measures of amenability to probation. The thrust of 
these factors is to acknowledge a cognitive or moral acceptance of guilt and 
a willingness to change. But using attitude and cooperation in court wrongly 
places a defendant’s relationship with the court as the measure of 
commitment. Rather, the courts should look to more meaningful 
demonstrations of remorse. Authentic displays of victim-centered 
 
81 State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 197 (Minn. 1992), (. . .”the trial court 
has broad discretion in dealing with ‘disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant 
defendants * * * *. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom 
atmosphere will be best in all situations.’” (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
343 (1970)).  
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consciousness of guilt, independent and unsolicited acts of community 
service, and a demonstrated commitment to “clean living,” such as a lack of 
new offenses, documented sobriety, and pro-social activities better express 
genuine reform than polite behavior in court. Placing an emphasis on a 
defendant’s relationship to the court also takes away focus on a victim – be 
it an individual or society – and potentially discourages legitimate criticism 
of the criminal justice process. And frankly, it is not much a measure of 
remorse at all. In my practice, I have seen plenty of defendants try to work 
the judge over with obsequious platitudes, only to turn back to their victim 
and speak of them in the vilest and most degrading of terms.82 There are 
simply too many intervening factors and motivations that could separate a 
defendant’s courtroom conduct (or misconduct) from his remorse or lack 
thereof. Therefore, the Trog factors of attitude and cooperation should be 
discarded because they do little to demonstrate genuine remorse and simply 
serve as an incentive to discourage courtroom disruption.  
In addition, differences in cultural background and personality may 
influence a judge’s perception of cooperation and attitude. Research indicates 
that the perception of emotions face barriers when communicated across 
cultural lines.83 Conflict and tension can increase in cross-cultural 
communication.84 Modern business scholars recognize a need for cultural 
intelligence and multiculturalism for better conflict management.85 Similarly, 
judges may face some difficulty identifying a defendant’s emotional 
expression if they are communicating across cultural lines. Therefore, a judge 
and defendant may miscommunicate, even if there is a genuine attempt by a 
defendant to convey cooperation or agreement. Compound those issues with 
personality disorders, possible chemical addiction, and otherwise general 
mistrust, a defendant’s presentation in court may not always accurately 
reflect their better judgment. But these limitations do not necessarily mean a 
defendant is recalcitrant or unamenable to probation either. Courtroom 
interactions face all the complexity and nuance as every human relationship. 
 
82 I submit that most prosecutors can attest to the illuminating content of 
recorded jail calls.  
83 Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Nalini Ambady, Universals and Cultural 
Differences in Recognizing Emotions, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 
159-64 (2003).  
84 P. CHRISTOPHER EARLEY & SOON ANG, CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE: 
INDIVIDUAL INTERACTIONS ACROSS CULTURES, (2003). 
85 Gabriela Gonçalves, Marta Reis, Cátia Sousa, Joana Fonseca dos Santos, 
Alejandro Orgambídez-Ramos, & Peter Scott, Cultural Intelligence and Conflict 
Management Styles, 24 INT’L J. OF ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 725–-42 (2016). 
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Some are more volatile, some are more subdued, and some folks just do not 
play well together. Consequently, the Trog factors of cooperation and attitude 
in court are such variable, subjective factors that they should bear little 
weight on judging a person’s “amenability to probation.”  
Ultimately, particular amenability to probation may be a practical 
and just means to appropriately address serious crimes that are a radical 
exception to an otherwise law-abiding life. Additionally, those crimes may 
be the culmination of tragic choices brought on by the sheer burden of 
poverty, chemical dependency, and social inequality. However, the law’s 
current state regarding “amenability to probation” and the Trog factors invite 
consideration of factors that are unfair, otherwise prohibited, or irrelevant to 
the ultimate goal. Significantly, particular amenability to probation is more 
likely a product of socio-economic factors that have no relation to criminal 
conduct. Similarly, most of the Trog factors are social factors that bear little 
insight into a defendant’s commitment to reform. Worse yet, some of the 
Trog factors may discourage legitimate and genuine expressions of protest, 
discontent, or attempts at self-advocacy. Likewise, these factors may be 
limited because of individual cultural or personality differences. In the big 
picture, particular amenability to probation and the Trog factors introduce 
too many impermissible or immeasurable factors into a sentencing judgment 
to be considered consistent or fair. The use of the Trog factors should be 
limited to age, prior record (or lack thereof), and concrete acts of remorse.  
C. A Note on Discretion 
Discretion is a double-edged sword. In one direction, it allows 
practitioners to rise above the letter of the law and deliver justice in 
exceptional cases -- be it leniency or greater severity. In the other direction, 
it is the entry point into which an individual practitioner’s own bias (implicit 
or explicit), undisclosed beliefs, or personal values can impact legal 
outcomes. Regarding the Trog factors specifically, discretion also allows for 
a wide variation in their application and weight. Absent individual review on 
appeal, there is little anyone can do to track, quantify, or review judicial use 
of the Trog factors. Consequently, there is little the public can do to review 
the bench’s use of “particular amenability to probation.” We must simply 
trust that Trog factors will be used appropriately and any gross misuse will 
be corrected by appellate review.  
 However, discretion can also be the means by which the bench acts 
as a collective whole. In which case, I would invite the courts and prosecutors 
to consider the reflections made here and consider foregoing or severely 
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restrict the use of the Trog factors and “particular amenability to probation” 
as grounds for dispositional departures. This approach is supported by 
common law precedent. “. . .[A] district court always has discretion to impose 
a presumptive prison sentence even if the Trog factors support a probationary 
sentence.”86 If the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court are unwilling to revisit particular “amenability to probation” 
and the Trog factors, the district court has the means to act on their own 
accord. And for the criticisms raised above, I ask district court judges to 
consider them in their own sentencing decisions going forward.  
D. Why Take Away a Tool? 
 Advocates seeking to reduce the use of incarceration as a means of 
punishment will rightfully point out that elimination of these factors take 
away legal tools that allow a court to find non-prison consequences for 
defendants. This is true. But the criticism here is not to suggest that more 
people should be in prison. It is a question of whether particular “amenability 
to probation” provides a wider backdoor for some to avoid prison, while 
others find that door narrowed by socio-economic factors outside their 
control. Whether the bar to go to prison is raised or lowered, the concern here 
is how the courts determine exceptions to that bar, no matter where it falls. 
If there are fewer means of avoiding prison based on socio-economic factors, 
outcomes will be more consistent and equitable. By tying a prison sentence 
more directly to conduct (rather than wealth, privilege, family, or politeness), 
efforts to reduce incarceration for certain crimes will also be applied more 
equitably (and arguably have greater impact). So, while the elimination of 
sentencing factors may impact rates of departure, they do not take away from 
prison-reduction advocates’ greater criticisms regarding incarceration.  
CONCLUSION 
 In the end, I offer that the particular “amenability to probation” factor 
and Trog factors should be revisited and severely restricted or limited. It 
opens the door to socio-economic factors that fall outside of a defendant’s 
control and could create patently unfair results. Whether through Guidelines’ 
amendment, common-law reconsideration, or a grassroots reformed practice 
by the district court bench, equal and fair treatment under Minnesota 
 
86 Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013), review denied 
(Minn. Feb. 18, 2014), citing State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2009); see, State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
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sentencing law would be well-served by rewriting particular amenability to 
probation and the Trog factors. 
